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To judge, to condemn the work or the man on the basis of what 
was a brief episode, to call for closing, that is to say, at 
least figuratively, for censuring or burning his books is to 
reproduce the exterminating gesture which one accuses De Man of 
not having armed himself against sooner with the necessary 
vigilance .... 
Having just reread my text, I imagine that for some it will 
seem I have tried...to protect, save, justify what does not 
deserve to be saved. I ask these readers...to take the time to 
reread. . . 
--Jacques Derrida, 
"Like the Sound of the Deep Sea 
Within a Shell: Paul De Manf.s War1 
My argument here starts from a truism: recent approaches to power have 
privileged the importance of discursive modes of power over coercive 
ones. Many of the sites, topics, and themes which dominated previous 
theoretical and empirical work on power, even as recently as fifteen 
years ago--the political economy of capitalist development, the role of 
elites and interest-groups in political decision-making, geo-political 
strategy, the social bases of revolutionary or authoritarian regimes, 
rape and sexual violence--have disappeared from view or lost their 
cultural capital in our reading lists and research projects.2 
Conversely, many of the sites, topics, and themes which preoccupy this 
conference, the work of its participants, and the larger community of 
discourse which it represents would seem bizarre, even scandalous, to the 
'power types' of that earlier era: the circulation of media 
representations, the ideological constitution of the categories which 
organize the domain of the political, the formation of racial 
subjectivities, the role of gender in the colonialist discourse. 
As a historical process, this shift from a coercive to a discursive 
problematic marked a sea-change in the development of social theory; it 
also signalled the emergence a new conjuncture for American academics and 
especially for the sectors of the academic left3 which have been its main 
agents. That conjuncture (I will call it "the ,80sI1 in these notes) 
broached a series of intellectual and political openings for the academic 
left in the United States; these form part of the successes which have 
provoked the astonishing panic over "political correctnessw on campus. 
At the same time, I think, the '80s narrowed our political efficacy and 
our analytical gaze in ways we need to explore. The ,discursive turnr4 
is symptomatic of both aspects of this conjuncture, bearing the traces of 
new openings and new closures. 
The concern of these notes is with the intellectual history, theoretical 
biases, and political limits of the discursive project. One way to map 
these, I think, is to revisit its Itother": the handling of what could be 
called the coercive approach to power in current work. Even in the most 
influential theoretical voices of the new problematic--(our) Althusser, 
(our) Gramsci, (our) Foucault--the discursive/coercive contrast remains 
inscribed on the field of power as its organizing opposition. Within 
that field, the problem of coercion has not been superseded, but effaced 
and devalued; it remains present as the unmarked category, incompletely 
theorized, incapable of focusing scholarly projects or concentrating 
institutional energy. 
The result has been.an intensely revisionist, ground-breaking, but highly 
selective engagement with issues of power. Both politically and 
analytically, we need to reclaim the problem, and the problematic, of 
coercion: to offer our attention to the issues of state terror and 
popular riot, of strikes and labor migration, of sexual and racial 
violence, of how wars are fought and how weapons and soldiers are 
produced. This is doubly true in the conjuncture in which we now find 
ourselves: a moment of structural and legitimation crisis for American 
capitalism, yet at the same time of Western "triumphw in the Cold War; in 
which the bloc tectonics which organized international politics for fifty 
years, if not nation-state system itself, is collapsing; in which 
enormous resources, from military infrastructures to oil to finance 
capital to immense new reserves of labor-power are mobile, untethered, 
and up for grabs. The discursive turn has partially empowered us to 
understand and participate in these transformations, but only partially. 
For me anyway, it is hard to read the paper without a sense of how 
sharply our considerations of power were disci~lined in and by the '80s: 
disciplined to turn our attention from certain kinds of settings, to 
frame certain kinds of questions and exclude others, to deform the 
answers we give. 
In saying this, let me stress that these notes do not propose a wholesale 
critique of the "descent into discoursetW offered in the name of a 
superior Theory of the Real.5 Discursive sites or modes of power are no 
less real, less effective, than coercive ones; understanding MTV is as 
essential to clarifying our situation as understanding the M-1 tank. 
Rather my critique comes from within the community of discourse. Its aim 
is not to refuse the space opened up by the discursive turn, but rather 
to open that space to themes and contexts which have largely been absent, 
even excluded, from it. What difference does the M-1 tank make? what new 
differences does it make in a world of MTV? Let us find out, integrating 
the discursive and coercive faces of power, uncovering the multiple ways 
they work together. And in the process, we might start to undo the 
conditions which made it seem natural to divorce them. 
How should we map the shift from a coercive and to a discursive approach 
to power? What differences in theoretical category and research interest 
does it mark? In lieu of a full investigation, let me start with an 
anecdote and a document. The anecdote comes from a class during the 
first days of the Persian Gulf War. Like many faculty, my team-teacher 
and I set aside our usual plans and opened a discussion of the conflict-- 
in this case, with a seminar of grad students in American Studies and 
English. What we heard was, in retrospect, not so astonishing as it 
seemed to me then: elaborate insights into the ways the war narrative was 
being framed by CNN; tactical arguments about whether antiwar activists 
should symbolically construct US soldiers as victimized or complicit; 
readings of how the video footage shot from those "smart bombsn 
&. interpellated the viewer as masterful warrior. What we did not hear was 
much discussion of the geo-politics of the conflict, the political agenda 
of Bush's New World Order, the political economy of the global oil 
market, or the effect of the war on Israeli, Arab, or Palestinian 
? nationalisms. I say this not to fault the participants in that 
discussion--or indeed because I expected a 'programmatic analysis of the 
power issues involved. In the early days of that conflict, one could 
" only feel confusion and anxiety. Yet it is telling that the class 
c responded to that feeling--or warded it off--by claiming the terra firma 
4 of cultural studies, media analysis, the critique of ideological 
-. representations. Power, we all knew, was massively at stake; and this 
41 was the familiar ground for contesting it. 
Nor is it useless territory to occupy. In the case of the Gulf War, the 
terrain of the discursive has offered us important resources for 
attacking the presentation of the war to the US public, for specifying 
how the public was insulated from information and decision-making power, 
for clarifying how left opponents and liberal skeptics of the war were 
silenced and delegitimized. It has not--though in a different milieu, it 
could have--helped to analyze the global economic stakes, the contours of 
policy struggles, the military strategies and resources which determined 
that and how a war would be fought. Nor (which might have been expected) 
have discursive approaches inspired new analyses of the political 
cultures, nationalist ideologies, and historic claims and grievances of 
the Iraqi, Kuwaiti, and Israeli regimes. If part of what we want from a 
theory of power is resources for the "analysis of the  conjuncture,^ then 
the discursive turn has only partially asserted its potentiality. 
The ncommon sensem to which that class turned in anxiety, this conference 
announces with bravado. Nothing registers our intellectual moment more 
clearly than the topics that have been included and occluded here. (I am 
working here from the original agenda and paper titles, not of course 
from the circulated work.) There are several papers on the circulation 
of representations and the discursive contruction of categories; several 
on the ideological context of intellectual practice; several on the 
construction of subjectivities in media or popular representations. At 
several points, 'older' sociological or institutional themes of power 
have been recast interestingly by linkage with new issues of ideology and 
culture: the role of representation in racial identity and hierarchy; the 
role of specularity in the Tudor regime. Nothing, however, on war, the 
military, or other sites of violence; a theoretical paper, but no 
empirical work, on modern state power; nothing on political economy or 
power relations in capitalist or state-socialist development. Again do 
not misunderstand: my point is stock-taking, not fault-finding. (And I 
certainly do not exempt myself from this account: I could easily have 
added my recent work on the bourgeois promenade as a ritual of class-- 
formation in 19th-century New York.) But agendas map the current givens 
of the community, delineating the fluctuations in gravitational force 
which pull interest in some directions, divert it from others. And there 
is a relatively coherent gravitational field in this agenda: a 
privileging of the semiotics of authority rather than the dynamics of 
social processes; a privileging of the power to construct (or resist) 
categories and identities, rather than the power to transform (or 
contest) conditions and institutions; a privileging of notions of power 
as that which constitutes rather than that which determines; a 
privileging of re~resentations rather than decisions as the modal product 
of power; a privileging of meanings over forces. 
Such a catalogue, however, offers only a sort of aggregative sketch, a 
'topographical distributiont of the difference between discursive and 
coercive approaches to power. It embeds that opposition in a series of 
descriptive or topical contrasts: between the violent and the civil, 
institutions and ideologies, social forces and cultural forms.. The 
implication is that theoretical approaches to power may be distinguished 
by the contents--the t v ~ e s  and sites of power--which they foreground. 
Yet such empirical contrasts do not necessarily entail theoretical or 
analytical distinctions. It is clear that the effects of even the most 
coercive form of power--torture, for instance--are mediated by the 
discursive codes with which people interpret it; conversely, those codes 
can be activated only-if they are embedded, reproduced, and circulated in 
material institutions and relationships.6 If these contrasts in content 
are not theoretically active, however, they are still symptomatically 
real; they map the effects of divergent approaches on the actual ways 
that power gets conceptualized and studied. To go beyond them, we need 
to excavate the generative assumptions which have constructed the field 
of power as an object of study in tdiscursivet or 'coerciver ways. Let 
us sketch that archaeology by turning from the conference agenda to the 
- intellectual history which prefigured it. 
It is striking, in retrospect, how multiple the influences were on the 
discursive turn. During the late /60s and early t70s--well before the 
European texts which codified.it were widely circulated in American 
universities--two different disruptions played key roles in opening up 
the space (and the need) to rethink where and how power worked. The most 
important, in my opinion, was the womenfs movement. In subjecting even 
the most ,privatef and 'intimatef relationships to political criticism, 
feminism made it possible to perceive what Foucault calls Itthe micro- 
physics of power," its permeation and interconnection throughout all the 
sites and bonds of social life. Not only did this transform the 
topography of power, subverting the idea that it fnaturallyf inhabited 
the fpublic,f formal, legal, institutional domain dominated by men and 
privileged by previous accounts of politics. It also reconceptualized 
the sort of effect which power named, from a force which acted on social 
agents from without, or a resource with which they negotiated conflicts 
with one another, to a determining medium which was embedded in, 
constitutive of, organized through, and reproduced by everyday life. At 
the same time, and most obviously, this generalization of power was not 
random or indeterminate, but patterned in specific social relations: in 
sexual inequality. '70s feminism did not, it seems to me, strongly 
differentiate the forms of that inequality in ways that we might classify 
as fdiscursivef or fcoercive.f Indeed part of its force was in denying 
that difference. Its recasting of power applied as much to speaking 
patterns at left graduate-students meetings--as many men learned with 
pain--as to sexual violence; it led to a practice of both CR groups and 
self-defense groups. Nonetheless, it seems to me, (70s feminism played a 
'key role in the emergence of the discursive turn. "The personal is 
politicalw made it thinkable to map domination and resistance in 
discourse, and conversely to subject the discursive to political 
critique. 
The second disruption was less overtly political: the transformation of 
the academic disciplines whose project was the study of power. During 
the '60s and early f70s, many fields of social analysis saw positivist, 
functionalist, and institutional paradigms of power give way to cultural, 
cogn,itive, and semiotic approaches. The transformation of labor and 
social history, for instance, is well-known. Under the influence of 
Edward Thompson, Herbert Gutman, and others, U.S. historians abandoned 
the fCommons-schoolf focus on unionsf institutional incorporation into 
American industrialism. The 'new labor historiansf not only emphasized 
the centrality of traditions, rituals, customary practices, and informal 
work relations as a terrain for asserting or contesting class power;'they 
also recast class-formation itself as a cultural process of constructing 
solidarities and antagonisms.7 The very phrase "cultural constructionu 
marks other moments in this disciplinary sea-change: within anthropology 
and sociology, a series of treatises--notably, Geertzfs Interpretation of 
Cultures and Berger and Luckmannfs Social Construction of Reality-- 
attacked functionalist theories of social action in favor of accounts 
which stressed the collective production of meaning as the constitutive 
activity of social reality, and interpretation as the constitutive 
activity of social analysis.8 In contrast to feminist critique, this 
interpretivist move often had the effect of rendering issues of politics 
and determination invisible. Ironically, however, it made possible a 
dramatic rethinking of power, a possibility illustrated by the career of 
the phrase "social constructionu itself: from a strictly epistemological 
coinage in Berger and Luckmannfs text, it has acquired the connotative 
capacity to ideologically charge any object to which it gets attached. 
Indeed, within political science, the Itshift from function to meaningu 
did radicalize accounts of power, most notably in Steven Lukesf manifesto 
Power: A Radical View and John Gaventafs empirical application of it to 
the study of an Appalachian coal mining community. For Lukes and 
Gaventa, a mthree-dimensionalw theory of power had to take account of not 
only the distribution of resources which overtly determined decision- 
making (first dimension) and the latent institutional biases which 
conditioned it (second dimension), but also "the power processes behind 
the social construction of meaningsn which shaped what counted as a 
legitimate decision, indeed what was decidable, in the first place.9 
For all their disciplinary and theoretical differences, these works share 
a common moment--roughly, the decade between the mid-'60s and mid-70s-- 
and a broad agenda. All were self-consciously conceived as critical or 
revisionist interventions against social-scientific traditions which 
looked for power in institutions, structures, or elites, which theorized 
its exercise around the metaphors of market negotiation, military force, 
functional efficiency, or Newtonian mechanics. Moreover (not unlike '70s 
feminist theory), they tended to enlarge the locale of "the politicalw by 
subjecting non-institutional and informal settings to analysis; to 
explore the ways power relations organized the solidarities, cognitive 
categories, and ideological assumptions within which social conflicts 
were waged; and conversely, to stress the role of meaning-making in the 
assertion, contestation, and negotiation of authority. 
During the '80s, these political and intellectual shifts were codified, 
extended, and redirected by the theoretical Great Migration with which 
groups like CSST have contended. As is well-known, two different 
European theoretical wensembles@l proved especially influential on the 
maturing of a discursive approach to power. At the same time, it is 
important to stress, the discursive turn drew on a particular and quite 
selective re-reading of these theoretical and political influences. 
Although nearly all the key texts of the new problematic were produced 
earlier--sometimes decades earlier--this re-reading made them historical 
phenomena of the conjuncture within which the American academic left 
appropriated them. The llGramscill of this archaeology is not a historic 
figure--leader of the Turin workersf councils, political prisoner of 
fascism--who handed down scriptural pronouncements on power to the '80s; 
'hef is a nexus of texts, lexicons, and interpretations constructed in 
and of the '80s. 
What theoretical encounters, then, were used to codify the discursive 
turn? First of all, the rediscovery of continental neo-Marxism, and its 
reinterpretation by such figures as Raymond Williams, Stuart Hall, and 
Fredric Jameson. This tradition is by no means assimilable to a single 
set of arguments, but a few categories and themes stand out as central to 
its reconceptualization of power. Most influential were Gramsci and 
Althusser, who each offered new means of theorizing the interfiliation of 
politics and culture begun the decade before. Both thinkers asserted 
that power relations not only influenced symbolic representations of 
social life but constituted them in the first place; both argued that the 
production and dispersion of representational.forms comprised a key 
condition for the reproduction (or disruption) of social relations, the 
legitimation (or subversion) of hierarchies of power, the masses' assent 
to (or refusal of) their subordination. For ~ramsci (especially as read 
by British cultural studies) this analysis pointed toward a critical 
sociology of representations and the role of cultural discourses in 
social conflict and crisis, His category of heaemonv named a mode of 
power relations in which leading groups sought to ventriloquize the 
ncommon sensew of the social formation as a whole, circulating values and 
symbols which might colonize the traditions and ethical consciousness of 
"subalternn groups. Such an "organization of consenttU Gramsci argued, 
was especially important in capitalist societies with a complex and 
autonomous civil sphere; indeed it was a precondition for taking and 
maintaining political authority.10 
In Althusser the category of ideoloav did parallel work. Where ~ramsci 
stressed the cultural investigation of conjunctural political struggles, 
Althusser focused his analysis on the institutions which promulgated 
dominant representations: llideological apparatuses" like the church, the 
press, and especially the educational system, whose function was to 
reproduce the social formation as refracted by the ideology of the ruling 
groups, Moreover, he argued that ideology shaped not only cultural 
values and assumptions but the very formation of subjectivity itself; as 
his famous maxim put it, "ideology interpellates individuals as 
subjects,11 endowing them with particular, socially constructed identities 
by addressing them in/as certain discursive positions. This formulation 
has been decisively influential on the new problematic of power. Like 
feminism, it politicized the most apparently private and secure realm of 
experience, eliding the individual's 'interiorf 'process of becoming a 
subiect with his or her subiection in and to 'externalf structures in 
dominance.11 
Gramsci and Althusser offered (different) accounts of how power relations 
produce representational discourses, which in turn work to reproduce 
power relations. At the same time, another neo-Marxist tradition, that 
of Bakhtin and his collaborators, was used to map the power-meaning 
circuit in the opposite direction; it offered ways of analyzing 
linguistic and literary production as a social and socially contested 
process. The "Bakhtin circlew provided the '80s with two important 
resources. First, the account of the carnivalesaue as a mode of 
representational excess by which lower classes .symbolically subvert the 
social order mandated by their betters. Secondly, the analysis of 
signification as a dialoaical process in which meaning is always produced 
through active negotiation and resistance; in which utterances are "shot 
throughn with multiple semantic possibilities which get actualized by the 
differential social (class, gender, occupational) resources of the actors 
appropriating them.12 Although derived from distinct projects, these two 
categories have been put to generally similar work within the new 
problematic. They each sociologize the category of meaning and suggest 
the need for a political ethnography of representations: an analysis of 
the ways in which social hierarchies get inscribe on the signifying 
process and. social conflicts get played out in its products. Moreoever, 
both categories underscore the historically specific, contingent quality 
of language as a social practice: its constitutive openness and 
incompletion as a site of discursive power. In contrast to Althusser and 
even Gramsci, then, the Bakhtin circle conceived the study of 
representations as a mapping of plurality and contestation, rather than 
of domination or incorporation. Within a discursive approach to power, 
it has been used as warrant for the excavation of "contradictory 
meaningsn and lloppositional momentsw within even the tflattest,t most 
commodified and apparently univocal of texts.13 
The other great theoretical influence was post-structuralism. Even in 
its seemingly apolitical variants, it has proven indispensable to the 
discursive recasting of power. Derridean deconstructive strategies, for 
instance, have been mobilized to show how representations efface the 
conditions of their own making and the social or ideological tensions to 
which they are a response. Given its stress on the indeterminacy of 
categories, its problematizing of the stability of the subject, and its 
debunking of the dream of total or transparent meaning, post- 
structuralist linguistic and interpretive theory lent itself to a mode of 
ideological demystification which has been one of the key political 
practices of the discursive turn. Not surprisingly, it has shown its 
political Itedge" most when deployed against ideologies in which social 
life is presented as inert, self-evident, or natural: for instance, in 
denaturalizing critiques of social relations like Scottts Gender and the 
Politics of Historv or Gatest "Race," Writina. and Difference.14 
The most important post-structuralist influence has of course been 
Foucault. He has rewritten both the vocabulary and thematics of power in 
ways which both recall and transform the other figures I have described. 
In many ways, for instance, Foucaultfs discourse does similar theoretical 
work to categories like heaemonv and ideolow; it has the task of 
theorizing a politics of representations, eliding political and 
epistemological fields of analysis. Yet discourse here is not figured as 
a stream of social-situated symbolic forms, nor as a pattern of dominant 
meanings; it is rather a tmoleculef of power and knowledge, a specific 
technology of power which institutes a domain of knowledge whose 
codification in turn reproduces and extends a regime of power.. Foucault 
is most interested in the historical project of understanding what he 
sees as the peculiar knowledge/power of modernitv: the "disciplinary 
discourses~ which make up a regime of universal surveillance and bodily 
regulation. Like Gramsci, he sees modernity as characterized by the 
circulation and permeation of power throughout every interstice of social 
life. Like Althusser and feminist theory, he sees it as reconstituting 
even the most fprivate,t seemingly ahistorical sites of human experience: 
not only the individual subject but the body itself. Finally Foucault 
grounds these ideas (the llcapillaryw circulation of power throughout the 
whole social body and its "investmentw of the individual body) in a 
concept of power not as primarily constrictive, limiting, negative-- 
coercive--but as compulsive, inciting, positive. Power in its modern 
modality is not to be understood as a force which acts on, and against, 
social agents. It is an ensemble of techniques and strategies which 
"invests them, is transmitted by them and through them," inscribing 
bodies with identities, desires, physical regimens, and in the process 
subjugating them to the disciplinary regime.15 
Of course, this sort of quick-and-dirty intellectual history of the 
discursive turn conceals all sorts of discontinuities and disagreements: 
differences over the integrity of the subject, for instance, or the role 
of human agency in history, or the usefulness of the ~arxist analysis of 
capitalist society. No 'unified field theory1 of power was constructed 
during the '80s. But there were common themes which organized the 
earlier openings into a relatively coherent problematic. Three such 
themes seem paramount. First, in contrast with an impulse to localize 
the 'habitations1 of power--elites, institutions, the state--and map the 
means by which they act on other sites of the social formation, the 
discursive turn has tended to propose a generalized topography of power 
(especially modern power), its extension throughout social life and 
permeation of even the most sequestered sites of human privacy, 
subjectivity, and physicality. Secondly, in contrast with a view of 
power as a vector of force or a market resource whose directionality or 
scarcity gets mobilized asainst social agents, the discursive turn has 
modeled it as proliferating and productive. Power is not what constrains 
or canalizes social processes (relationships, identities, ideologies, 
desires) across a fixed landscape, like the.interaction of balls on a 
billiard table, but what constitutes the landscape from the start. As 
Foucault states it: "We must cease once and for all to describe the 
effects of power in negative terms: it lexcludestl it lrepresses,l it 
lcensors,l...it lconceals.r In fact, power produces; it produces 
reality; it produces domains of objects and rituals of truth." 16 Finally 
(and as a consequence) the discursive turn has theorized the modal 
activity of power not as the dynamic determination of outcomes or 
decisions but as the relational construction of meanings, ideologies, 
representations, objects of knowledge. Power discursively constitutes 
the field of "the socialw--with its seemingly self-evident architecture 
of solidarities, interests, institutions, necessities--on which outcomes 
can be negotiated or contested. Power produces and gets inscribed in 
discourses; discourses organize and reproduce the domain of power. 
During the '80s, then, European social and interpretive theory helped to 
codify previous work into a new, revisionist problematic, a ldiscursivef 
account of power in tacit opposition to a 'coercive1 one. At the same 
time, there were two important ways in which the discursive turn marked a 
departure from, even a break with, earlier work. These discontinuities 
measure both the strengths and the limits of the new problematic; they 
are symptomatic of the contradictory situation of left academic culture 
in the Reagan years. 
The first difference is the enormous prestige accorded to theory itself. 
Earlier explorations of a discursive approach viewed "theoretical 
formulationstW in the words of Clifford 'Geertz, as gghover[ing] so low 
over the interpretations they govern that they donrt...hold much interest 
apart from them."l7 Thus key theoretical interventions emerged out of, 
and remained embedded in, concrete cases of political or scholarly 
practice: Geertzr reading of the Balinese cockfight, the telegraphic 
manifesto with which Thompson opened The Makins of the Enalish Workinq 
Class. Since the early '80st however, much of the academic left has 
pursued a mode of scholarly work in which theory is increasingly divorced 
from immediate political or empirical projects. Indeed the weight of 
interpretive authority has shifted so much that a citation from Althusser 
or a category from ~olosinov has come to replace the warrant once derived 
from archival evidence. Ironically, this investment of theory relies on 
a selective appropriation of the theoretical sources on which it is 
grounded. Many of the canonical influences on the new problematic freely 
mix theoretical, empirical, and political analysis. It has taken active 
(sometimes head-pounding) work to disengage a usable account of hegemony 
from Gramscils musings on the Risorgimento; or to extract Bakhtinls 
notion of heteroslossia from his specific reading of novelistic 
discourse. This shift of concern from a theory of power to the power of 
theory needs itself to be subjected to a discursive critique which would 
be both theoretical and historicizing; we need to clarify what 
ideological and institutional factors have made it seem the 'natural1 way 
to use these materials. 
Secondly, and more relevant here, the '80s brought a much more rigorous 
dichotomization of di~cur~sive and coercive approaches to power, and a 
more polemical privileging of the former. The political and intellectual 
openings of the '60s and '70s often sought, it seems to me, to engage the 
two approaches, however eclectically and unsystematically. Interest in 
the cultural politics of cognitive or symbolic representations, for 
instance, or the micro-politics of everyday social relations tended to 
recast, but not reject, the 'classic1 power issues of violence, material 
inequality, institutional or state prerogatives. Thus '70s feminism 
sought to link the discursive reproduction of male dominance with sexual 
violence and female economic dependency. Similarly the new labor history 
explored the interrelationship between working-class communal, movement, 
and work cultures and the productive forces and social organization of 
capitalist development. Even an anti-positivist manifesto like The 
Social Construction of Reality organized itself around the problem of how 
a fundamentally intersubjective process of social construction gets 
congealed--#linstitutionalized"--into a hard, resistant, "objective 
reality." As Berger and Luckmann ask, "How is it possible that 
subjective meanings become objective facticities?"l8 
These efforts at integrating "meaningsw and wfacticitiesw were often 
unsatisfactory; they tended to rely on dualisms--Berger and Luckmannls 
!#objectivew versus "subjective" reality, Thompson's distinction between 
"social being1# and "social consciousness~l9--which remained unworked-out , 
and metaphysical. Indeed part of what made the discoveries of neo- 
Marxism and post-structuralism so exhilerating was the promise they held 
out of displacing the binaries--materialism/idealism, culture/society, 
domination/consent--within which social, political, and interpretive 
theory seemed trapped. Thus the codification of a discursive approach to 
power has tended not merely to decenter issues of coercion, repression, 
state and military authority, and social determination, but to radically 
displace them. And it has tended to problematize as ideological, 
exclusionary, and unstable the central categories--class, sex, race, even 
"the socialw itself20--around which those issues were analyzed. 
This marginalizing of the themes and categories of 'the coercive1 is most 
evident not among the ur-theoreticians of the discursive turn, but in the 
work which has put them to use. In Laclau and Mouffels Heaemonv and 
Socialist Stratesv, for instance, Gramscirs exploration of the centrality 
of "hegemonicn cultural authority to the organization of social blocs and 
the waging of political struggle gets condensed into a theory of the 
relational articulation of interests and solidarities so pristine that it 
dissolves away any notion of determinate social forces or coherent social 
formations. Henry Louis Gates makes a similar de-essentializing move 
when he places quotation marks around Mrace,m recasting the category as a 
ideological construction with no .'real1 grounding in natural or somatic 
difference. Even Foucaultfs work on prisons and clinics, it seems to me, 
has been most actively and imaginatively deployed in the study of 
representational 'regimesf rather than institutional ones. John Tagg and 
Mark Seltzer have used it, for instance, to retell the history of late 
19th-century reform photography and urban narrative; but there has been 
little Foucaultian investigation of such straightforwardly fdisciplinaryl 
settings as the school system and the military.21 
Thus the most illuminating instances of the discursive approach have 
tended to array issues of power within topical and conceptual 
hierarchies. Textual and representational sites of analysis get 
privileged over social and institutional ones; themes of semiotic or 
ideological construction over those of social conflict and determination; 
a politics of demystification and critique over one of solidarity and 
engagement. As I noted above, this pattern of energy has more to do with 
the ways we have appropriated the theorists of the new problematic than 
with the full range of their texts. As with the divorce of theory from 
conjunctural practice, the foregrounding of discursive modes of authority 
and the marginalizing of coercive ones has been a phenomenon of the '80s. 
It has required a rigorous but selective re-reading of the fauthoritiesf 
themselves. 
For it is striking how frequently fcoercivef topics, categories, and 
readings appear in such influential figures as Gramsci, Foucault, and 
Althusser; how persistently these thinkers constitute the domain of power 
around the opposition of coercive and discursive modalities. Althusserls 
celebrated essay on ideology, for instance, is grounded in a typological 
distinction of "ideologicaln from wrepressive" apparatuses.22 The Prison 
Notebooks elaborate an analogous series of analytical binaries by which 
Gramsci restates and explores the discursive/coercive relationship: war 
of position versus war of maneuver, leadership (direzione) versus 
domination (dominazione), consent versus force. "Hegemony," far from 
serving as a purely cultural or ethical category, is most often used to 
name the dialectic between these two fmoments' of power in the 
maintainance of a ruling bloc: "The fnormall exercise of hegemony ... is 
characterized by the combination of force and consent, which balance each 
other reciprocally ..." Similarly Gramscifs investigations into European 
history stress the conjunctural importance of military force and strategy 
in political struggle.23 
With Foucault, the case is more complex. His programmatic statements 
often call for the collapsing of the dualities I am mapping here: @#To 
analyze ... the microphysics of power presupposes,@@ he argues in 
Discipline and Punish, @@that one abandons...the violence-ideology 
opposition ...It His concrete analysis, however, constantly reinstates 
such oppositions, precisely to focus its energy, like sunlight in a 
magnifying glass, against the conventional notions of power it seeks to 
subvert; thus the account of panopticism turns on the contrast between 
the internalized (self-)regulation it induces and physical coercion: 
He who is subjected to a field of visibility, and who knows it, 
assumes responsibility for the constraints of power...; he 
inscribes in himself the power relation in which he 
simultaneously plays both roles..., By this very fact, the 
external power may throw off its physical weight; it tends to 
the non-corporeal; and, the more it approaches this limit, the 
more 'constant, profound, and permanent are its effects: it is a 
perpetual victory that avoids any physical confrontation ... 
The theoretical syntax of Foucaultts analysis of power is relentlessly 
dualistic, dependent on projecting a tcoercive othert against which it 
gains its polemical edge. This dualism is repeatedly inscribed in the 
syntax of the prose itself, its endless parsing of distinctions: "Far 
from being an art.of unbearable sensations punishment has become an 
economy of suspended rights." "The expiation that once rained down upon 
the body must be replaced by a punishment that acts in depth on the 
heart, the thoughts, the will, the inclinations."24 
Coercive power thus remains a problem--not residual, but constitutive-- 
for each of these theorists. It serves all of them as an analytical 
presence against which they launch their interventions. Yet this 
presence is uneven and incomplete, subordinated to the discursive issues 
which each foregrounds as the central, captivating problem of power. 
Thus in "Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses," Althusser 
introduces the Ivrepressive apparatusu mainly as a boundary concept. He 
describes it rather straightforwardly, as the organized public agencies-- 
police, army, administration--which "function by violencew to ensure 
social reproduction; the implication, especially in contrast with the 
elaborate revision of the category of ideology, is that the meaning of 
"the repressiven is self-evident and unproblematic.25 In Foucaultts 
work, this displacement is not only analytical but chronological. It is 
in the past, in the ancien reaime, that he most clearly portrays the 
elements of the coercive problematic at work: a wsovereignn in whom power 
is localized, set against a wsocietyfl over which he seeks to impose his 
authority through ritualized violence. Conversely, what characterizes 
modernity is the dispersal and effectivity of discursive power/knowledge. 
Foucault does not go on to reconsider what place coercive power might 
hold in the modern regime: what role physical violence yet plays in 
disciplinary settings, for instance, or whether "the repressive 
hypothesisgt retains a partial usefulness in explaining the historical 
invention of sexuality.26 Like Althusserts "repressive apparatus," these 
issues simply drop from view. 
With Gramsci, the story is a bit different. He does not programmatically 
seek to displace the problem of coercive power; his aim is precisely to 
explore the dialectical interaction of the two modes. Yet in practice, 
in the texture of his investigations, he does tend to slip into the same 
pattern. In contrast, for instance, to the definition of fi8hegemonyu as 
the successful articulation of coercive and discursive power--"the 
combination of force and consentu1--Gramsci will often use the word to 
foreground the ethical, ideological, consent-making component of rule. 
Thus he insists that political parties must combine "the levels of force 
and of consent, authority and hegemony, violence and civilization..."27 
The slippage in his diction is telling. For it is hard to work through 
the Notebooks without sensing that what truly engages Gramsci--as it 
engages us in his work--is the discursive understanding of power opened 
up by llhegemonyw and related concepts. 
For each of these theorists, then, the coercive remains thematically 
subordinated. And yet there is a final point to make about its presence 
in their work: the persistence with which it turns up symptomatically 
within the conceptual and rhetorical economy of their ldiscursivel 
arguments, Traces of the coercive paradigm--power conceived as unitary, 
forceful, deployed in and by institutions, reproduced in and by outcomes, 
differentially possessed by subjects in history--reappear even as, and in 
the way that, these thinkers recast power as fragmented, diffused, 
deployed in and by ideologies, reproduced in and by representations, and 
constitutive of subjects in history. In Althusserls essay, for instance, 
we can see this phenomenon in the privileging of the state as the site of 
the apparatuses which produce and circulate dominant ideologies. To be 
.sure,-his argument works to problematize our conventional notions of "the 
statem as a site of power, pointing toward its revision from an 
institutional and empirical category to a functional and theoretical one. 
Nonetheless, the very process of enlarging the domain of "the statetg 
implicitly reinstates the idea of a central, integral subject of power, 
exercising it strategically over the whole social formation in the, 
interest of reproducing the dominance of the ruling class.28 In The 
Prison Notebooks, the trace of the coercive is neither so systematic nor 
so functionalist. It occurs in the obsessively military rhetoric with 
which Gramsci analyzes political contestation: the naming of the lower 
classes as "subaltern," the constant comparison of parties to armies, the 
characterization of class struggle undertaken in periods of stabilized 
social antagonisms as a "war of positi~n.~~ As with Althusser's use of 
the state, this metaphorical discourse has a recursive effect: it 
disrupts the category of #Ithe military,vv suggesting the need to re- 
examine it as a discursively constructed, ideologically productive 
institution, Yet it also marks, I think, what could be called a sort of 
conceptual nostalgia: the impulse to ground the analysis of power on the 
'hard,' localized, determinate, familiar ground of battle, a terrain 
where distinct collective subjects with discrete interests and aims can 
be watched mobilizing their forces against one another.29 
Both of these impulses--to militarize and to totalize the treatment of 
power--are latent in Foucaultrs work as well. Like Gramsci, he is drawn 
to metaphors of games and battles--strategy, tactics, deployments, the 
massing of forces--although somehow he manages to get these to stand for 
agent-less.processes and techniques. More importantly, he tacitly 
projects a view of the modern regime as unitary, concentrated, and 
homogeneously oppressive, even while insisting on its fragmentation, 
"capillaryw dispersal, and individuating effect. This projection is not 
situated in any one conceptual locale, like Althusser's invocation of the 
state. Rather it is itself a 'dispersed1 effect of Foucaultls narrative 
presentation: the sense he elicits of our inhabiting a closed and airless 
modernity in which all resistances and heterogeneities are massively 
recuperated by power. At the same time, this tension between his overt 
argument and the affect it produces is not simply atmospheric. It is 
also inscribed in the most important and influential of his figures for 
the modern regime: the Panopticon. Here is a contradictory 
representation of power if there ever were one: an emblem of the endless 
proliferation and internalization of (self-)regulatory discipline, but at 
the same time, a paranoid fantasy of a single, central, omniscient locus, 
external to everything it subordinates, from which all power emanates-- 
the State, the Law, the Father. It is this highly cathected figure of a 
unitary, coercive power, I think, which gives Foucaultfs account such 
force.30 As with the deployment of "the statem in Althusser and "the 
militarym in Gramsci, it represents not only a discursive recasting of 
power, but a'symptomatic re-inscription of its coercive effects: a 
nostalgia for the clarities of the paradigm being displaced: a return of 
the repressive. 
VII . 
Two sorts of question follow from this intellectual history. First of 
all, why did these thinkers persist in organizing the field of power 
around the discursive/coercive opposition? Why, given their core 
interests, did they recur to coercive themes, settings, and categories, 
even re-inscribing these conceptually and rhetorically in their accounts 
of discursive power? Answering this question properly would entail a 
complex effort of historical and political contextualization. Thus we 
might link the militarization of Gramscifs rhetoric and analysis to the 
conflicted history of Italian state-building and the role of armed force 
in organizing the fascist regime which imprisoned him. Again, we might 
view Althusserfs privileging of the state in light of the centralized 
development of the French state, especially its dominance of education, 
the wIdeological State ApparatusM which interests him most.31 .Such a 
contextualization would be essential to analyzing these thinkers, but I 
would like to be excused from pursuing it here. I want to treat their 
re-inscription of the coercive more simplistically: as the trace of 
"something true." The problem of coercive power keeps recurring, it 
seems to me, because they could not think power without it. Sometimes 
(as with Foucault) this recurrence marks a theoretical or interpretive 
necessity: it is against the typological or chronological foil of the 
coercive that his discursive topography of power composes itself. 
Sometimes (most strongly with Gramsci) it marks a political or historical 
imperative: the project of constructing a 'theory and politics of the 
discursivef remains unfinished until articulated with a (revised) 'theory 
and politics of the coercive.' 
My own sympathies, it should be clear, lie with the second claim, with 
'Gramscir rather than fFoucault.f But whichever way we account for the 
persistence of the coercive in these texts, it makes the second question 
more pointed. Why have we persisted in ignoring it? Posing the question 
this way assumes two things. First that there is a "wew integrally 
committed to (in fact, organized by) the intellectual and political 
project of understanding power in new, discursive ways: a community of 
discourse that we call "culture-and-power-typeslf or "cultural studiesn or 
sometimes here at UM, "CSST." Secondly the question assumes that "welt-- 
the foot soldiers of the discursive turn--have not only repeated the 
subordination of the coercive performed in the influential texts, but 
done it more completely. 
This erasure has been both analytical and empirical. On the one hand, 
while many seminars and sleepless nights have been devoted to figuring 
out the meaning and utility of concepts like ~thegemony,v Itsubject- 
positionlW wspecularity,n and "heteroglossia," we have not spent much 
energy (not programmatically at least) revisiting the problematic of 
coercive power. How should we rethink its typical themes, concepts, and 
issues--sovereignty, repression, insurgency, subsistence, social 
interests, state power, imprisonment, war--not instead of, but in light 
of the discursive turn? How do these questions in turn disrupt and 
recast the agenda of a discursive approach? On the other hand, as my 
earlier glance at the CSST conference program suggested, our research 
interests have tended to institutionalize this theoretical bias. I think 
that I speak for "us" in saying that the most inspiring and influential 
recent work on power has concerned such issues as the ideological 
construction of racial and gender identities; the popular reception and 
appropriation of commercialized representations; the ethnography of 
symbolic or everyday resistance; the transgression or destabilization of 
dominant sexualities; the articulation of sexuality with colonialist or 
nationalist ideologies; the role of cultural rituals in the construction 
or contestation of hegemonic blocs--all of these richly influenced by the 
thinkers I have been discussing. We have not seen much work, equally 
suggested by 'the authorities,' that revisits such topics, settings, and 
narratives as state-building, work discipline, labor insurgency, the 
dynamics of political mobilization or incorporation. Nor have we paid 
close attention to the claims of new 'coercive issues1 whose historical 
emergence has coincided with the discursive turn: the crisis of the 
international state system; the end of the Cold War; the global spread of 
environmental crisis; the proliferation of 'terrorismt and 'low-intensity 
warfare1; the accelerating global mobility of capital and labor-power; 
the economic reorganization described by categories like tpostmodernityl 
and 'late capitalism.' 
To catalogue such gaps is not to call for a reversal, a return to some 
Good Old Cause--whether Marxist political economy, modernization theory, 
or social history. It is simply to note where we have missed the 
opportunity to extend the new paradigm, and politicize it in different 
ways, by engaging it with its 'other.' Why, then, these silences? Or 
rather: why have these silences seemed so natural? Answering this 
question means returning from the history of theoretical influences on 
the discursive turn to the history of the situation within which they 
have been appropriated--returning to the conjuncture of the '80s. By way 
of sketching a little of that history, I would underscore the importance 
of three particular conditions of our recent intellectual work. 
First, it is clearly crucial that the discursive turn. has coincided with 
a radical transformation in the production and circulation, volume and 
velocity, and ideological effectivity of cultural representations. This 
revolution in media technology and mass cultural forms intensified the 
processes by which the consumer economy was 'put into discourse1 and, 
conversely, those by which information, news, and other representations 
were commodified. It proceeded in two complementary directions. On the 
one hand, the '80s brought an intensive saturation of social life by 
media discourse. The proliferation of new circuits of representation 
(cable TV, VCR's) and the consolidation of entertainment conglomerates 
(Sony, Time-Warner) arrayed technical, institutional, and market networks 
through which commodity-representations could ramify and circulate faster 
and longer than ever. To take only one current example: a blockbuster 
movie, technically dependent on special-effects capacities only a few 
years old (The Addams Familv), both disseminates and is advertised by an 
MTV hit ("Addams Groovew1) performed by a commercial rapper (Hammer) who 
has already spun off his own children's cartoon and action-figure toys, 
and whose other current hit ("2 Legit 2 Quitww) became the signature tune 
of a professional sports team (the Atlanta Falcons) owned by the cable-TV 
magnate (Ted Turner) who founded CNN. This ever-more-total permeation of 
mass-mediated cultural discourse throughout social life is both reversed 
and reinforced by an ever-more-total appropriation of ,realt social life 
as 'signifying materialf to be magically transformed into commodified 
spectacle: hence the amazing popularity of phenomena like llcourt TVtn 
"unsolved mysteries," and "home-video blooperw shows.32 On the other 
hand, the '80s brought the extensive ulobalization of mass culture. The 
pace and precise.timing of this change came home vividly to me in the 
summer of 1988, when I took my first trip to Europe in-six years. One 
sleepless night in a hotel room in Hungary--two years before the fall of 
the Communist regime--I found myself watching French soap opera, German 
police shows, the BBC news, and a live feed of the Republican National 
Convention from C-SPAN. 
This discursive transformation has had contradictory political effects. 
The same process of cultural saturation which produced Time-Warner and 
Hammer, after all, provoked (and commercialized) the counter-practice of 
'gangsta rap.,33 The '80s began with the demand of Polish Solidarity 
that its Gdansk negotiations with the Communist regime be broadcast live; 
it saw the emergence of the fax machine and the e-mail network as key 
tools of both transnational capitalism and democratic internationalism; 
it ended with the demolition of the Berlin wall--already breached by 
consumer appeals from West-German TV--and the flooding of East Berliners 
into the western sector to buy chocolate. My point is not to sort out 
the play of these hegemonic and counter-hegemonic effects (personally, I 
put buying chocolate on the fcounter-hegemonyf list). It is simply to 
note that, in the face of them, it has perfect sense to privilege 
discursive power. We have been living a transformation which confirms 
every day the thematics of the new approach: the proliferation of 
apparatuses of spectacle and surveillance, the dispersal and effectivity 
of representations, the politics of interpretive struggle, the power of 
discourse to destabilize, transgress, and reconstitute the boundaries of 
social life and political affiliation. To paraphrase Marshall Bermanfs 
great slogan, post-modernism is the realism of the late-20th century.34 
The second factor which has conditioned the discursive turn concerns the 
tsubject-positionf from which we have observed, experienced, and analyzed 
these transformations: that of the academicized left. Here, too, it 
seems to me, the I80s were a time of contradictory effects. Especially 
after the crisis of the academic labor market the decade before, they 
brought a measure of institutional stability and authority to a cohort of 
intellectuals who were radicalized by the '60s and professionalized in 
its aftermath of its demise. The situation of the academic left in the 
'80s reflected this mix of political mobilization and 'inward mobilityf: 
the successful construction of an enclave inside the academy which has at 
once protected, empowered, and contained its intellectual culture. As 
university faculties became a generational refuge within an inhospitable 
political landscape--one of the few settings where it could truly be said 
the left maintained its presence--intellectual work has increasingly been 
seen as an important site of contestation; transforming the disciplines 
has come to seem crucial to resisting wdisciplinew itself. Lest we think 
this idea mere narcissism (as I sometimes do), it was strikingly affirmed 
by the right's recent counter-attack on "political correctness." It is 
this situation of autonomy and insulation that has invested "theoryu-- 
especially theories stressing the subversion and denaturalizing of 
categories--with the prestige which I mentioned as the one key aspect of 
the '80s. And it has given the political practice of the discursive turn 
its characteristic di,fference from the populism of the academic left in 
the '60s and '70s: a practice of demystification rather than alliance- 
building, of ideological critique rather than solidarity work, of 
creating cultural-studies journals rather than public-history exhibits. 
Nowhere is the distance between intellectual and movement politics more 
evident than in CSST. We have never, in the three years I have been an 
enthusiastic participant, connected our interest in the 'politics of the 
discursivef with either current crises like the Gulf War or campus issues 
like multi-cultural teaching or the resurgence of racism and anti- 
Semitism. Many of us work on these issues 'elsewheref; CSST seems a 
place for something different, we say when the problem is rais'ed; which 
is exactly the point. 
There is no question here of a moral or strategic failing. Discursive 
power is real, and our intellectual work has helped produce important 
advances in understanding, contesting, and using it. Yet if the new 
problematic reflects an appropriate, even empowering response to the 
situation of the '80s, it also marks the limits and constraints of that 
situation; most of all, it marks the ascendance of American conservatism 
everywhere else exce~t the universities. This is, I think, the third 
factor which has decisively conditioned the discursive turn. Given the 
right's historic achievement, it was 'naturalf to retreat, rethink, and 
problematize, to reappropriate texts (in ways) that could help sanction 
cultural contestation and intellectual critique, to discover 'the 
oppositionalf in sit-coms and music videos; it was natural because there 
was nothing else to be be done; or rather because there was just too much 
else to be done. Perry Anderson, in a brilliant intellectual history of 
Western Marxism, argues that its Ithidden hallmarkw was being "a product 
of defeat." Given the failure of socialist revolution in the West and 
the successive triumphs of fascism and bourgeois democracy, he writes, 
the Marxist tradition abandoned its traditional concerns with economic, 
political, and conjunctural analysis and 'retreatedf into a (ground- 
breaking) reconsideration of culture and aesthetics. Without wanting to 
second Anderson's celebration of 'classic Marxism,' it seems to me that 
something similar can be said of the discursive turn. For all the power 
of its insights into the politics of representations, and for all the 
space it has won within the academy--the very space of this conference-- 
it has been marked by the pathology of defeat. As another practitioner 
of counter-discourse, the satirist Tom Lehrer, states it: 
Remember the war against Franco 
That's the kind where each of us belongs 
Though he may have won all the battles 
We had all the good songs.35 
VIII. 
Let me conclude these notes by sketching where their implications seem to 
me to lead. Three other claims follow from what I have written; in fact, 
my argument depends on thelp. The first is that, despite the profound 
insights of the discursive turn--insights which have transformed my own 
work and which I want formulaically but with utter conviction to honor 
here--the partiality with which we have pursued it has deformed our 
understanding of power. I had originally planned to illustrate some of 
the effects of that deformation through two examples: the response of the 
intellectual left to the Gulf War and the contention over Paul de Man's 
youthful writings in Nazi-occupied Belgium. In lieu of a full treatment, 
let me just say that the first case seems to me to illustrate the 
constraints of the discursive approach to power on our research program, 
on the scholarly division of labor. We have not equipped ourselves to 
understand much of what we need to know--concerning military technology 
and strategy, for instance, or the global oil market or the history of 
mid-East national movements--in order to contest Bush's New World Order. 
One result is that there has been, to my mind, no critical exploration of 
the causes, issues, conduct, or effects of the war--an analysis which 
would cry out for an integration of discursive and coercive approaches. 
The second case does not involve empirical gaps, but conceptual ones. It 
illustrates the deforming effects of disengaging these two approaches to 
power, of narrowly privileging either one, on the process of analysis , itself. Thus, to one side, we see the spectacle of left-wing anti- 
deconstructionists (most notably, Jon Weiner) gesturing toward the 
implication that the contorted anti-Semitic utterances of the young de 
Man represent prefigurations of poststructuralism. To the other, we see 
de Man's friends (most notably, Jacques Derrida) displacing the moral 
accusation back on to his attackers: "To judge," Derrida writes in the 
essay from which I drew the title and epigram to this paper, "is to 
reproduce the exterminating gestureN of the Nazi's themselves, mirroring 
the 'totalitarian logict of their regime in a 'totalizing' reading of the 
wartime journalism.36 It would be an understatement to say that neither 
position sheds light on Paul de Man's war--on the fields of power which 
those ugly articles inscribe--or on the politics of post-structuralism. 
How then to integrate discursive and coercive understandings of power in 
ways which could clarify what actually happened in Kuwait last year or 
Belgium fifty years ago? This is the second theme left hanging in my 
argument. Again, in lieu of a full discussion, let me sketch a few 
points. Most important is the understanding that "the coercive" and Itthe 
discursivew do not name distinct types of power or distinct settings in 
which it is exercised, as if it were a matter of 'accessing' the right 
problematic for a particular context. Rather they name two different 
moments or modalities of power, always co-present and co-efficient in its 
exercise. Thus, as I noted earlier, even the most extreme deployment of 
coercive power--say, torture--is discursively organized and interpreted; 
while conversely, even the fthickestf scene of discursive authority--say, 
a conference meeting room--is structured by such coercive effects as the 
segmentation of the academic labor market, differential command of 
capital resources, even the policing mechanisms which regulate access to 
the room itself (all of which effects are themselves discursively 
mediated...). Every practice, event, conflict, or relationship--a rape, 
a wage contract, a battle plan, a paper assignment--has both discursive 
and coercive dimensions. Indeed this truism has been implicit in the way 
I have been distinguishing the two moments of power all along: as an 
opposition between that which constitutes social phenomena (bodies, 
subjectivities, communities, institutions, relations) and that which 
determines how social phenomena (bodies, subjectivities, ... etc.) interact 
as constituted. For what it means to say that social phenomena exist in 
history is precisely that they are both always already constituted in a 
field of coercive determinations always being reconstituted in a 
field of discursive articulations. These fields of effect dialectically 
affect each other. Every conjuncture is in the process of determining 
outcomes, which discursively recast the conjuncture, within which an 
array,of possible new outcomes gets opened; every conjuncture is produced 
by, and productive of, a combination of coercive and discursive effects. 
Moreover it is possible, without being overly formulaic, to begin to 
describe the fcombinatory logicf by which these effects tend to work 
together. That logic is grounded in the fact that each of these modes of 
power has its own particular type of effectiveness and at the same time 
its own particular ineffectiveness; each tends to undermine itself in the 
process of being exercised. Coercive power has the advantage of its 
coerciveness: it dictates and specifies, canalizing ambiguous situations 
into determinate effects that are one way and not the other. When a 
female worker follows the arbitrary directives of a male manager, for 
instance, all kinds of ideologies--legal, sexual, economic--discursively 
organize and fmoralizef the hierarchy; but it is his power to institute 
the situation of "being-firedn that finally enforces her deference. Yet, 
while such coercive authority can compel outcomes, what it cannot do is 
to elicit the consent of the subordinate to the 'OK-nessf (if not the 
justice) of their subordination; and as the theorists of the discursive 
turn compellingly argue, this consent is necessary to the ongoing, active 
reproduction of social life. Exercised in isolation, then, coercive 
power loses not only its legitimacy but its efficacy, provoking 
countervailing forms of coercive resistance: the worker quits, or 
strikes, or quietly sabotages her work. Its effectiveness depends on 
constant mediation by ideological discourses which sanction the manager's 
authority and interpellate the worker as rightfully subject to it: 
symbolic dramas which constructing the workplace as a patriarchal family, 
for instance, or folk-theories about the necessity of managerial 
autocracy to the efficient functioning of capitalism. 
At the same time, the special effectiveness of discursive power--its 
capacity to moralize relationships, to constitute social identities, to 
solicit consent--is itself intrinsically unstable. It depends on the 
production of representations which are always, in Barbara Fieldsf 
wonderful phrase llpromiscuous crittersu: unfixed, multivalent, open to 
recombination with other representations, available for oppositional or 
alternative uses. (If the workplace is supposed to be one big happy 
family, after all, the aggrieved worker has a powerful language with 
which to make material claims on her boss, or moral appeals to third 
parties.) This is where the coercive comes back in. It is coercive 
power which disciplines the wpromiscuityll of this process, arresting the 
play of discourses in some determinate (although provisional and short- 
lived) array. Thus as the manager and the worker struggle over what "we 
are all a family heren means, the negotiation is not, can never be, 
purely discursive; it is underwritten by his capacity to fire her, by her 
capacity to sabotage or strike, by the subtle or overt means they use to 
coerce one another. If discursive power saves coercion from its own 
illegitimacy, coercive power saves discourse from its own indeterminacy. 
The discursive moment in power is what sanctions a situation; the 
coercive moment is what guarantees it. 
These propositions--that power has two modalities, that they are always 
co-present, that they combine in ways shaped by their special efficacies 
and lacks--may help to open the investigation I am advocating here. Yet 
they cannot not push it very far. For the dialectic of coercive and 
discursive power cannot be mapped in theory, only in the particular 
analysis of specific situations. That is the third truism with which I 
want to conclude. I had originally thought to end by citing some recent 
work which seems to me indicative of new directions in the concrete 
analysis of power, work which both incorporates and exceeds the insights 
of the discursive turn: Elaine Scarryfs searing analysis of the structure 
of torture and war; Ava Baron's anthology on the 'gendering' of U.S. 
working-class history; Roger Rouse's use of postmodernism to explore of 
the lives of illegal migrant families circuiting between rural ~exico and 
northern California; Fernando Coronil and ~ulie skurskifs study of state 
terror and popular rioting in contemporary Venezuela as a rupture of both 
the nation-building projects of the countryfs elites and the material 
social compact fueled by its oil boom.38 These works point in wildly 
divergent, perhaps even incompatible directions. Yet each appropriates 
different resources of the discursive turn to revisit 'coercivef topics-- 
violence, work, migration, state repression--which have tended to be 
downplayed. Moreover they do so in ways which engage themes and issues 
that are emergent in our situation right now: the effect of the global 
mobility of labor on notions of community, the effect of the Third World 
debt crisis on political culture and national ideologies, the effect of 
nuclear proliferation on the structure of war and state violence. Such 
problems not only invite but require the rethinking of power. And that 
is the final point I want to make. The most urgent reason to go beyond 
the discursive problematic (and to carry it along with us) is that the 
historical moment in which it emerged has given way to something new. 
The '80s, thank God, are over. 
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